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ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to find out the economic outcome of joint forest management 
(JFM) programme for forest fringe community and government based on a field survey of Bankura 
district in West Bengal. This empirical study suggests that the economic outcome of the JFM 
programme has been beneficial for both government and forest community and this is due to the 
strict dominant cooperative strategy of community, not government. Economically, government was 
the worst sufferer for her earlier restrictive forest policy. The higher economic outcome of the 
government is due to the cooperation of community whom government neglected earlier. Our study 
under the model of common property resource (CPR) game also suggests that in spite of equal effort 
level for each type of player, cooperative equilibrium is also stable with the highest level of stock. 
This study also suggests that force or law can not effectively control the illegal collection of timber 
forest products for the poor agricultural households, which mainly depend on forest resources for 
livelihood security and that live below poverty line, until and unless a considerable increase in the 
income from legal forest products and forest wage income meet their livelihood security. 
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This paper attempts to find out the economic outcome of joint forest management (JFM) 
programme for forest fringe community and government based on a field survey of Bankura district 
in West Bengal. 
Forests contribute significantly to the economic, social and environmental well being of a 
country. Their role is more pronounced  in  a  developing  country  like India that has a predominantly  
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agriculture-based rural economy. Forest in India constitutes just over one-fifth of the land area of the 
country. Forest meets nearly 40 per cent of the energy needs of the country (more than 80 per cent in 
the rural sector), the bulk of it as direct subsidy to the poor. They also provide about 25 per cent of the 
fodder needs of our vast cattle population. Forest products are crucial to the rural and tribal economy. 
Many of the products, including non-timber forest products (NTFPs), provide sustenance to the rural 
people who collect a large part of their day-to-day necessities, including food and medicines, from the 
forests (Sarma and Rai, 2000: 207). The dependence of tribal on forests for sustenance and income 
generation is also significant, ranging from 15 to 84 per cent, depending on the community and region. 
The overall estimate is that 33 per cent of the tribal earn their livelihood from forests and forest 
products. The World Bank Report (2006) indicates that forests offer vast potential for poverty 
reduction and rural economy growth in India while also supporting critical national conservation goals 
(World Bank, 2006: xiii). The Report also revels that half of India’s 89 million tribal people, the most 
disadvantaged section of society, live in forest fringe areas and forests have the potential to improve the 
livelihoods of forest dwelling people, particularly tribal people who are the most disadvantaged group 
in Indian society (ibid: 2). Increasing interest in rural poverty alleviation has thus resulted in a new 
focus in the forest dependent poor (Fisher, 2004; Pattanayak et al., 2004; Angelsen and Winder, 2003; 
Kumar, 2002; Kumar et al., 2000; Arnold, 2001; World Bank, 2001; Wunder, 2001; Cavendish, 1999; 
Scherr et al., 2002; Somanathan, 1991). 
Issues relating to households’ income accounts in rural areas of southern Malawi in Africa 
are presented by Fisher (2004) in two sources – forest and non-forest (farm, self-employment, non-
forest wage work, sales assets and transfers)1. There is rich empirical evidence to support the claim 
that forest is an important source of income for the poor forest fringe households through the 
extraction of wood (timber and firewood) and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) or non-wood 
forest products (NWFPs) by preserving the forest resource sustainable with the help of cooperative 
management (Somanathan, 1991; Pattanayak et al., 2004; Guha, 1989; Jodha, 1986, 1992; Kumar et 
al., 2000; World Bank, 2001). In an attempt to measure the effect of JFM on various social groups – 
landless, marginal farmer, small farmer, medium farmer and large farmer – Kumar(2002) observes 
that the poorer sections of village community are disproportionally dependent on non-wood forest 
products both for subsistence and extra income due to low opportunity cost of labour (p.770). Access 
to forest for fuelwood is substantially important to local people and makes substantial contribution 
to households’ welfare (Pattanayak et al., 2004: 176). The demand for fuelwood collection for poor 
households is inelastic with respect to their travel cost (or the shadow price of fuelwood) indicating 
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that fuelwood is essential for these households, whereas improved economic conditions that increase 
household wealth and raise opportunity cost reduce household dependence on fuel wood from 
forest(ibid:175). Asset-poor in Malawi in southern Africa are observed more reliant on both low 
return forest activities (LRFA) – e.g. fuel wood and non-timber forest products – and high return 
forest activities (HRFA) – e.g. timber – compared with the better off and access to forest income in 
rural Malawi help the poor not only to prevent by supplementing income, but also to improve their 
living standard over time (Fisher, 2004: 147-151). Without any legal punishment by law traditional 
cooperative management system based on self-enforcing social norms and customs – each person 
knows that if they cheat, the other will as well, and to their supply of forest products in years to 
come will be jeopardized – were enough to restrain people from overlooping and looping trees from 
forest and the prevailing conditions ensures that the forest dependent households did not suffer from 
a scarcity of forest resource on which they were so dependent (Somanathan, 1991:PE 38-9). 
This paper attempts to find out the economic outcome of joint forest management (JFM) 
programme for forest fringe communities and government who jointly manage the forest protection 
activities, based on a field survey of Bankura district in West Bengal. The present paper is important 
in that it tries to examine as to whether the institutional arrangements of community management 
under JFM have been economically beneficial for its member households belonging to agricultural 
households under three categories – landless, marginal farmer and small farmer – which depends on 
forest for their subsistence and income, compared with strict regulatory policy system of government 
before JFM, and contribute to extract forest resources sustainably. This paper is organized as 
follows. Section II presents the historical perspective of the study. A short review of relevant 
common pool resource (CPR) game is contained in section III. Section IV deals with survey design 
and methodology of the empirical exercise. Section V covers the findings of the study. Conclusions 
and policy implications appear in section VI. 
 
II. Historical Perspective 
Evidence of earliest forest management by the state is found in Kautilya’s Arthashastra (BC 
321) which refers to ‘forests’ being managed as ‘state reserves for revenue’ and for ‘public use’ 
(Sarmah and Rai, 2000: 209). But, indeed, no rulers in India did execute these policies in the 
management of forest resources of our economy before 1988. Rather, the forest policy of India 
before the year 1988 was oriented with commercial need either of the government or of the rulers of 
India without safeguarding the traditional rights and concessions of the forest fringe communities on 
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forestland. There was no systematic management of forest in the country before 1865. Some of the 
recorded forest conservation measures were initiated by Emperor Ashoka, as is testified by the 
decrees inscribed in rock and pillar edicts (ibid: 209). This concern continued till the beginning of 
the 6th century. Systematic management of forest in country began in 1864 with the appointment of 
Dietrich Brandis, a trained German forester, as the Inspector General of Forests. The government 
decided to treat forests as state property by enacting the Indian Forest Act, 1865 (Act VII of 1865). 
Although, the first Act of forestry in India was enacted in 1865, the major laws governing forestry 
have formulated by the Indian Forest Act of 1878, Indian Forest Act of 1927 and the Forest 
Conservation Act of 1980 (World Bank, 2006: xvi). The Forest Conservation Act of 1878 and that 
of 1927 emphasized commercial timber production. The Forest Conservation Act of 1980 and the 
1988 National Forest Policy shifted the pendulum strongly towards forest conservation and joint 
forest management (ibid: 16-18). The revision of the National Forest Policy in 1988 marks a major 
departure from the earlier policies which emphasis on production of commercial wood and disregard 
for local need (Poffenberger, 1995; Sarmah and Rai, 2000: 213), because Government of India, then, 
could understand that until and unless the benefit of forest fringe communities is secured, neither 
forest resources nor forest management can be sustainable. So, in order to execute sustainable forest 
management system, the active participation of local forest communities in forest management for 
conservation and development plans of forest resources and the participatory forest management on 
usufruct sharing basis for safeguarding their traditional rights subject to the carrying capacity of 
forest was first introduced and implemented by the National Forest Policy of 1988.  
However, far-reaching developments in the demographic, economic, social and 
environmental fields have resulted in the revision of the National Forest Policy in 1988. The national 
policy of 1988 constitutes a significant departure from earlier policies of forest management 
practice, for its emphasizes on: 1) obtaining the active participation of local people in forest 
conservation and development programmes of local forest lands; and 2) the benefit sharing 
arrangements, which is intended to provide village communities living near the forests a stake in the 
protection and development on the degraded forests. 
JFM programmes in India currently span over 27 states, represent 85000 village 
communities, and cover more than 17.3 million hectors of forestland. The programme encompasses 
an estimated 8.3 million families, half of which are SC and ST (Bahuguna, 2004, cited in World 
Bank, 2006:1). Most JFM committees use the surrounding forests mainly as a safety net or for 
regular or seasonal subsistence production of firewood, fodder and minor forest products.  
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The JFM in West Bengal has its origin in the success achieved in rejuvenating a patch of 17 
hectares of degraded forests under a pilot project implemented during 1972 near Arabari in 
Midnapore district. About 618 families living in 11 villages lying in the fringe voluntarily protected 
these forests when in return they were assured provision of fuelwood and fodder from the 
regenerated forest and employment in forestry activities. In 1987 these villagers were also declared 
as beneficiaries for these rejuvenated forests and granted 25 per cent share from the revenue earned 
from final harvest. This project made both government and community benefited (SFR, 2000:47). It 
seems to be relevant to mention that the key precursor to JFM in India, from a management 
perspective, was a local level initiative, dating from the early 1970s, in the Arabari in West Bengal 
(Jeffery and Sundar, 1999:28). 
In West Bengal, the JFM movement gathered momentum when in 1989 a programme of 
resuscitation and reestablishment of moribund sal and other hardwood forests in the districts of 
Midnapore, Bankura, Purulia, Burdwan and Birbhum in south West Bengal was initiated by the 
government with the active participation and involvement of the local people. West Bengal 
government’s resolution in 1989 was issued by declaring the principles of sharing of duties, 
responsibilities as well as the usufructs from the forests to the participant local people living in the 
fringe of the forests. The procedures for establishment of the institution called forest protection 
committee (FPC), comprising of these participants as members, were also defined. The foundation 
of an innovative forest protection system and the participatory forest management was thus laid for 
the forests of south West Bengal which covers approximately 38 per cent of the total forest area of 
the State. West Bengal State Forest Report (2000) clearly mentions: 
“As a result of participatory and joint forest management activities in south West Bengal the 
vast tract of scattered, over-exploited and degraded forests containing mainly the sal were 
resuscitated and restored to productivity with great improvement in quality and density” (SFR, 
2000: 47). 
Government report (State Forest Report, 2000) reveals that the overexploitation of trees for 
timber was so severe that thousand and thousand hectares of forest lands in the south West Bengal 
except Sundarban were almost treated as bare plain land, when the JFM was established; but such 
lands are almost secured after JFM programme. Secondly, government revenue from the degraded 
forest was almost nil when the JFM was established, but it has significantly increased after JFM. 
However, with regard to the historical perspective of the Government of India in general and 
Government of West Bengal in particular are concerned, we usually observe two forest policies of 
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the government – strictly regulatory policy (SRP) and cooperative policy (CP). The SRP was usually 
used before 1988 when the JFM was established and CP has been executing as soon as the JFM 
came into being. Hence the strategy-set of government is {SRP, CP}.  
On the contrary, against the custodian forest management system (SRP action of 
government), the local forest fringe communities in different parts of India have mobilized 
repeatedly from long past to protect their traditional right on forest (Poffenberger, 1995). In keeping 
with this, Santal, Bhumij and Mahato tribal with some low cast Hindus in south West Bengal 
mobilized repeatedly against Mughal and British rulers to protect their traditional rights on 
forestland from long past. Chur Rebellion (from 1767 to 1805), Naik Revolt (1806-16), Hul 
Rebellion (1855) are the glaring examples of the history in south West Bengal where forest fringe 
communities organized resistance against rulers of India to protect their own right in forestland. 
During Chur Rebellion, the tribal communities of this area mobilized resistance through a series of 
armed revolts against the British empowered a new class of zaminders who took attempts to clear 
forest land and convert it into agricultural land to increase their revenue. Tribal guerrillas were so 
effective that even as late as 1800, after nearly forty years of British occupation, a collector reported 
that two thirds of Midnapore consisted of jungle, the greater part of which was inaccessible’(Sarker 
and Das, 2004: 172). Yet, gradually the Company succeeded in strengthening its control, despite 
subsequent revolts by forest people, such as the Naik Revolt (1806-16). The pressure on the forest 
grew further by the 1860s as the growing railway system demanded immense quantities of sal logs to 
provide sleepers for rail bed. Commercial demand for timber accelerated forest cutting, and raised 
the value of forestlands. Timber merchants rushed in, even before the rail lines opened and began 
leasing or purchasing large tracts from the Midnapore Zamindary Company and other zamindars. In 
early 1855, six to seven thousand Santal tribal from, Birbhum, Bankura, Chotonagpur and Hazribagh 
began meeting for organizing resistance in response to their growing marginalization. On July 16, 
1855 some ten thousand tribal, under the messianic leadership of four Santal brothers stood their 
ground firmly and fought with bows and a kind of battle-axe in a battle near Pirpaiti (Dutta, 1940: 
26). The revolt collapsed eventually after half their members were reportedly killed. Despite their 
defeat, the Hul Rebellion (as it is known among the Santal) profoundly influenced the ideological 
development of many Santal communities (Duyker, 1987: 35), and lives on in the songs and oral 
traditions of the tribal people of this area. 
JFM can, thus, be seen to emerge as the major policy change and attempt to create a new 
relationship between the government and the community in terms of cooperative framework. Thus, 
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from the standpoint of the forest fringe community is concerned, one may usually find two actions of 
the community on its forestland – fighting policy (FP), which was mainly executed when 
government’s SRP was in operation. They usually executed this policy to meet up their livelihood 
security. The cooperative policy (CP) of forest fringe communities has been gaining ground on as 
soon as the JFM programme came into being. So the community’s strategy-set is {FP, CP}. 
 
III.  Review of the Relevant CPR Game 
The daily livelihood of vast masses of the rural poor in many countries depends on the 
success with which common pool resources (CPRs) – such as forest and water resources – are 
managed and on the environmental consequences of their management. “CPR (common pool 
resource) management is a collective action dilemma: a situation in which mutual cooperation is 
collectively rational for the group as a whole, but individual cooperation is not necessarily 
individually rational for each member”(Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 2002:577). There is now a 
vast literature which examines the problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources by 
game-theoretic framework (Clark, 1980; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; Ostrom et al., 1990; Gardner et 
al., 1990; Ostrom et al., 1992; Chichilnisky, 1994; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996; Dayton-Johnson 
and Bardhan, 2002). Game theory provides a useful tool for many problems in environmental 
economics. The theory is concerned with the strategic action of different agents/players where these 
actions are in some way interlinked. It is said that the absence of private property rights in common 
property resources is characterized by a negative externality whenever the resource is scare; this 
leads to inefficiently high levels of extraction, possibly high enough to exceed the maximum 
sustainable yield, and threaten thereby the long run viability of the resource. But there is 
considerable literature of common pool resource game which suggests that cooperative management 
of common property resources guided by social norms and customs have been successful over long 
period of time (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Williamsen, 1985; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1990; 
Hecheter, 1987; Acherson, 1993; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). In a study of CPR institution, 
Cordell and McKean (1992) identity the established codes of conduct which are far more binding on 
individual conscience than any governmental regulations. These codes of conduct serve to ensure 
both sustainable aggregate harvests and an equitable distribution of access to the resource. Acheson 
(1993) is another example of sustainable management of common resources based on customs and 
social norms. In fact, self-organized CPR institutions have been devised without reference to 
centralized authorities and sustained over long period of time (Hechter, 1987; Willamson, 1985). 
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Empirical evidence suggests that individuals facing social dilemmas in many cases develop credible 
ex ante commitments without relying on external authorities: appropriation from CPRs have 
repeatedly shown their capacity to organize themselves, establish credible commitments, monitor 
each other behavior and impose sanctions on those who breaks their commitments (Gardner et al., 
1990; Ostrom et al., 1990). Ostrom et al. (1992) find that high level of cooperation can be sustained 
for the management of CPRs if the possibility of pre-game communication is present, with or 
without the possibility of costly sanctions. The game-theoretic model of Sethi and Somanathan 
(1996) suggests that cooperative behavior guided by social norms of restraint may be stable to run 
the common property resources and pastures in a well defined sense against invasion by narrowly 
self-interested behavior; when the social norms break down, it generally lead to the lowering of the 
long run stock, and possibly to its extraction (p.766). This model follows from Somanathan’s (1991) 
empirical evidence which describes a variety of traditional arrangement guided by social norms, 
customs and courtesy designed to enable Himalayan villages in India exploit their common forest 
sustainably without the possibility of costly sanctions. The CPR game of our study which emerges 
from our empirical evidence seeks to examine as to whether the interaction between community and 
government over a trade off between economic outcome from extracting commonly owned 
renewable forest resource is beneficial for both guided by a variety of institutional arrangements 
under JFM programme leading to exploit forest resource more sustainably compared with the system 
of strict regulatory policy (SRP) of government before JFM. 
 
IV. Survey Design and Methodology 
The data have been collected through an intensive field enquiry covering all members from 
three sample female FPCs and three joint FPCs under Bankura district2 of West Bengal. We have 
taken samples from all forest divisions – Bankura (North), Bankura (South) and Panchayet (SC) – 
under Bankura district, because almost all female FPCs exist in this district only. For the selection of 
female FPCs, random sampling technique (SRSWOR) is used. First, we have taken three sample 
female FPCs, taking one from each division of the district with the method of SRSWOR. Second, 
we have taken all members of each sample female FPC for our study. The number of members of 
each female FPC has been collected from the records of the respective FPC. However, total number 
of members from three sample-female FPCs is 120 in number – Brindabanpur (56), Agua (23), and 
Malibona (41). To make a comparative study of FPC members between female FPCs and joint 
FPCs, we take three joint FPCs along with three sample female FPCs for our study. First, each joint 
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FPC has been selected based on the criterion of close proximity (nearest distance in km.) to each 
sample female FPC. Second, all members of joint FPCs have been selected for our final survey. 
Total number of members from three joint FPCs works out to 182 in number – Katul-2 (93), Balboni 
(44), and Baragari (45). However, total number of members selected for our field survey including 
female and joint FPCs, work out to 302. It is worth mentioning that each FPC was formed in the 
respective village. So FPC/village is synonymous in the study. 
The data of six FPC-villages under our study were considered for two-time points – before 
JFM and after JFM situations. The period of collecting data for ‘after situation’ in all FPCs is same – 
between April 2005 and March 2006. But the period of data for ‘before situation’ was not same to 
all FPCs. JFM programme in Agua, Belboni, Malibona, Baragari, Brindabanpur and  Katul-2 FPC-
villages was started on February 1993, February 1993, March 1996, December 1996, April 1991 and 
September 1990 respectively. ‘Before situation’ for each FPC is considered for the preceding one-
year period from the starting of JFM programme in the respective FPCs. For example, ‘before 
situation’ in Agua FPC-village was between February 1992 and January 1993. But the major 
problems in measuring different socio-economic indicators are the level of measurement 
(household/village/community/group), types of statistical information (variable/attribute), 
difficulties in ascribing the changes to a particular programme (like JFM programme) from other 
variables (programmes) influencing these changes, unit of measurement (for example 
kilograms/days/standard cattle). To some extent, these problems or limitations can be dealt with 
through the adoption of appropriate techniques of data generation and estimation procedures. An 
appropriate baseline survey of the households would contribute to capture the changes better. But 
such baseline data set are often not available; the problem in such cases is that we cannot observe the 
participating households without observing the programme at the same time. This is the major 
loophole of this study. One way of addressing this problem is to have a control group, which is 
similar to the participating group in all respects except the programme so that the control group may 
act as the counter factual of the participating group. But it is difficult to find such a matching group 
in this study, because there is hardly any household of forest fringe communities without JFM 
programme in the area we surveyed.  Even the recent JFM programmes operating in this area 
originated before the year 2002. A second best solution in this regard is reflexive comparison where 
‘before’ and ‘after’ scenarios are compared for the participating households. This would be helpful 
to provide reasonable estimates of the impact provided that there is no serious memory lapse 
problem among the respondents (Ravallion, 2001). But memory lapse is directly related to the time, 
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which passes away after initiating the programme. By using the ‘double difference’ method where 
‘before’ and ‘after’ situations are examined for both control and participating groups, these biases 
can be further minimized. Due to non-availability of data of matching control group for the causes 
mentioned earlier, we had to depend on ‘reflexive comparison’ where ‘before’ and ‘after’ situations 
are examined for participating groups only. ‘Before’ and ‘after’ estimation are analyzed for all 
households involved in the JFM programme under our study. More importantly, the share of timber 
sale received by each FPC from the forest department was equally distributed among all households 
irrespective of the economic status of households. 
As regards the strategy-set of community is concerned, two FPCs – Baragari joint FPC and 
Brindabanpur female FPC – out of six provide some distinguishing features. First, Baragari joint 
FPC under Bankura South Forest Division came into existence in December 1996, although the 
West Bengal Government’s initiative for JFM programme was operative in this forest division on 
and from 1989, during this period i.e. from 1989 to 1996, the government policy was cooperative but 
Baragari community’s strategy was ‘fighting’. This is mainly because of more heterogeneous 
community structure and high endemic factionalism among the community members in this village. 
Secondly, the establishment of Brindabanpur female FPC under Bankura’s Panchayet (SC) Forest 
Division is a classic example in that a) it is the first female FPC not only in West Bengal but also in 
India; its leader Mrs. Parul Lohar was awarded Government of India’s honour for her noble work; 
still she is the leader of this FPC; and b) unlike the usual practice, the primary initiative for the 
establishment of FPC was taken by the collective action of the members of this locality3. The 
members of this FPC came forward at first for the establishment of female FPC in their locality and 
local forest officials responded after three years. By this transition period community’s policy was 
cooperative but government policy was strict (SRP). The distinguishing feature of Brindabanpur 
female FPC and Baragari joint FPC, however, helps us calculate the economic outcome of forest 
fringe community and government for their two distinct strategy profiles {FP, CP} and {CP, SRP}, 
the first and second actions of each distinct strategy profile being the community and the government 
respectively, based on our field survey. 
This study considers simple technique of measurement like arithmetic mean, proportion, and 
tabular analysis for examining our stated objective. The outcome of the strategy profiles of 
government and community has been explained in simple game theoretic approach along with 
common pool resource (CPR) game presented in the appendix. Additionally, a simple mathematical 
model is also used for our study. 
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V.  Findings 
At the very outset, we examine some basic characteristics of our sample FPCs (Table 1). 
First, all members of FPCs – both female and joint – in five FPCs out of six are either SC or ST 
(column 11).  In Baragari joint FPC, about 90 per cent of members do not belong to SC/ST. Second, 
about 43 per cent of households (129 out of 302 cases) are landless, about 45 per cent of households 
are marginal and the rest, about 12 per cent are small (columns 7, 8 and 9 respectively). In our 
sample there is no household, which belongs to medium or big category4. Third, over 77 per cent of 
households in each village live below poverty line5 (column 5), the incidence of poverty being the 
lowest in Baragari (77.78 percentage). Fourth, except Baragari and Katul-2, majority of members in 
each village are illiterate (column 12). This study, however, indicates the abject economic and social 
conditions of the tribal people who are among the most disadvantaged group in rural Indian society.  
Table 2 presents annual net real income (in Rs.) of sample households from forest source, 
non- forest source and from all sources along with the change of income between two time points. 
The real income (in Rs.) is determined after deflating the money income by cost of living index 
(general) of agricultural labourer. As mention earlier, we consider the year 2005-06 as the base year. 
In doing so we use the technique of splicing (which consists in combining two or more overlapping 
series of index number to obtain a single continuous series) 6. Table 2 shows the following important 
results: 1) annual net real income (in Rs.) for all categories of households under our sample except 
small land holding households in Baragai joint FPC have considerably increased (ranging between 
12.84 and 41.56 percentage points) after JFM (column 11); 2) the increase of the annual net real 
income of households from all sources is only due to the net increase in income from forest source 
after JFM (column 9); 3) the annual net income from non-forest source of sample households in all 
FPCs has decreased to a large extent (column 10); 4) the dependence on forest income for all 
categories of households has considerably increased after JFM(column 3). Before JFM programme 
the annual net real income from forest source out of annual net income from all sources from sample 
households ranges between 61.56 percentage point and 78.51 percentage points (column 6). It 
implies that forest was major source of income for all categories before JFM; 5) after JFM, annual 
net income of forest fringe communities has made a substantial increase. After JFM programme, the 
contribution of annual net real income from forest source out of annual net real income from all 
sources from sample households works out between 65.84 and 89.62 percentage points except 
Baragari FPC (column 3); and 6) the incidence of the dependence on forest income is much lower 
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for the households belonging to the better economic position on land status after JFM programme 
(column 9). It is important to mention that per capita annual net real income from forest source 
(PCANRIFS) is considered as the economic outcome (payoff) of the community. In order to 
calculate PCANRIFS, annual net real income from forest source of all sample households is divided 
by total number of members (calculated from columns 3 and 6 respectively in Table 2).  
The share of annual net real income derived from different sources of forest and non-forest 
sectors for agricultural households (landless, marginal farmer and small farmer) of six FPC-villages 
(during before and after situations of JFM programme) under our study appears in Table 3. Some 
important features that emerge from Table 3 are: i) forest sources – NTFPs, forestry wage and timber 
forest products (TFPs) – account for major share of annual net real income for all categories of 
households both after and before JFM programme situations. After JFM net return from all non-
forest sources – farm, non-forest wage and others – have decreased for all categories of households 
except farm income for only small farmer households in Baragari FPC. Conversely, annual net real 
income from two forest sources – NTFPs and forest wage – has increased for all except NTFPs 
source in one category of households – small farmer households in Baragari FPC. As the households 
of small farmer of Baragari FPC could not diversify their income generating activities within forest 
sources – for example, NTFPs – like others, their share of farm income increases by about 11 
percentage after JFM, although their share of annual net real income from farm source out of their 
annual net real income from all sources are below 20 per cent before and after JFM. ii) more than 80 
per cent of annual net real income of landless and marginal farmer households, who are relatively 
asset poor and that also live below poverty line, come from forest sources except the same categories 
of households under Baragari FPC after JFM programme, whereas the contribution of net forest 
income was at best about 65 percentage for the same categories of households before JFM (Table 2). 
The significant increase of forest income after JFM is due to two sources – NTFPs and forest wage, 
the highest contribution being the NTFPs source (Table 3). However, the incidence of forest income 
is higher for the households which belong to lower land-based economic condition after JFM 
programme. iii) after JFM forest provides much income generating opportunity for all categories of 
households in all FPC-villages. As regard forest wage labour is concerned, not only the landless and 
marginal categories of households but also small farmer category of households are involved in 
forestry works. This is due to attractive high forestry wage rate compared with local wage rate in 
non-forest sector. Wage rate for forest wage labour is fixed at Rs. 67.50, which is about a double of 
the average local wage rate, for usually eight hours of service from 8am to 4pm. But forest wage rate 
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and the number of working days as wage labour under forest department by the poor forest fringe 
communities are more or less fixed. Usually, one person from each poor household with a family 
size of five or less gets the opportunity of forest work from 35-40 days per year. If the size of 
member of a poor household is grater than five, usually, two persons get the opportunity; iii) out of 
annual net real income from all sources, NTFPs’ share has increased in all FPCs for all categories of 
households, except small category of households in Baragari FPC. But most importantly, compared 
with before JFM period the change of annual net income of NTFPs after JFM, particularly, for 
landless and marginal categories of households, who are relatively asset poor than small categories 
of households and that live below poverty line, marks a major increases, ranging between 42.38 
percentage point and 440.73 percentage point, in all FPC-villages excepts landless and marginal 
categories of households in Baragari village. Conversely annual net real income from timber forest 
products (TFPs) generating from illegal source7 for landless and marginal categories of households 
in Baragari FPC-village has increased during after JFM period as compared with before JFM period, 
whereas net annual real income from TFPs yielding from illegal source for the same categories of 
households in other FPC-villages has considerably decreased during the same period, ranging 
between 44.27 percentage point and 72.71 percentage point. Moreover, net annual real income from 
TFPs has considerably decreased for small category of households in all FPC-villages. 
The break-up of annual net real income from legal and illegal forest sources for below 
poverty line households before and after JFM situations appears in Table 4. It reveals that the illegal 
income from TFPs after JFM has substantially increased (30.59 percentage point) to poor categories 
of households which live below poverty line in Baragari joint FPC (column 9). The change of illegal 
income from TFPs after JFM for the same categories of households to other FPC-villages is highly 
negative (ranging between 20.77 and 74.47 percentage points). This is mainly because the change of 
income from legal forest products of the poor categories of households of Baragari FPC after JFM is 
much lower than that of same categories of households in other FPCs. In all FPCs, except Baragari, 
the change of income from legal sources of forest is highly positive ranging between 42.91 
percentage point to 117.17 percentage point; in Baragari this change is negative (12.92 percentage 
point). It clearly indicates that force or law can not effectively control the illegal collection of TFPs 
of the poor categories of households, which live below poverty line, until and unless a considerable 
income from legal forest source meets up their bare minimum level of subsistence. 
However, while considering per capita annual net real income from forest source 
(PCANRIFS) as the payoff of the community together with the break-up of share of income from 
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different sources, we also calculate the government’s economic outcome by considering annual net 
real income from forestland per FPC (ANRIFFPFPC) as the economic outcome (payoff) of the 
government. As mentioned earlier, the payoff of the Government of West Bengal (GoWB) from the 
degraded forest, particularly from south West Bengal is concerned, was almost nil for her SRP. A 
little payoff that GoWB would usually receive from this forestland was the auction sale of those 
trees that were removed by rain and/or by storm. As no specific government revenue had been 
reported from the FPC we surveyed before JFM was established and, on the contrary, government 
does not give an account of her little revenue for the particular division as a whole, we consider the 
critical ANRIFFPFPC for government as Re.1 for her SRP. 
With a list of pure strategies available to each player, we now have the game of two-player 
(so that the industry is a duopoly) with two strategy sets G ={SRP, CP} and C ={FP, CP} along with 
its four distinct strategy profiles {SRP, FP}, {SRP, CP}. {CP, FP}, and {CP, CP} in the following 
simple form. It is assumed that both players choose annual net real income in per capita/per FPC 
terms rather than annual net money income. First, we use normal form of representation in analyzing 
static game (simultaneous move) of complete information8. In figure 1, payoff in the left hand side 
indicates the payoff of community and right hand side, the government’s payoff.   
Obviously for community, FP is strictly dominated by CP, because 2570>2359 and 
3723>2613. It seems to be important to mention that for government, the strategy SRP is said to be 
weakly dominated by CP9. But when a strictly dominated strategy equilibrium exists we can 
confidently predict that this will be the outcome of the game (Bierman and Fernandez, 1998: 34). So 
as a rational player, community will not play FP. Thus government knows that community is 
rational; then government will eliminate FP from community’s strategy-space. SRP is now strictly 
dominated by CP for government. Thus community knows that government is rational, and then 
community will eliminate SRP from government’s strategy-space leaving the strategy profile (CP, 
CP) as the outcome of the game. This process is called iterated elimination of strictly dominated 
strategies. Unlike Prisoner’s Dilemmas case, this outcome is Pareto optimum because it is not 
dominated by any other outcome of the game. The outcome (CP, CP) will hold good as producing 
cooperative is a dominant strategy for community. So the strategy profile (CP, CP) is the unique 
Nash equilibrium. 
The outcome (CP, CP) will also result if community or government moves first. In the 
dynamic game of complete and perfect information, we may extend the extensive form of 
representation of a two-player, two-stage game in figure 2. Here the players move in sequence, all 
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previous moves are common knowledge before the next move is chosen, and the players’ payoff for 
each feasible combination of moves are common knowledge.  
Now if we think of strategies that the players use, we find that government has choices at one 
node (the node A) at which she can choose either SRP or CP. Community has to choose at two 
different nodes B and D. Community’s strategies are (FP, CP), (FP, FP), (CP, CP) and (CP, FP). 
Now what strategy is then equilibrium strategy? 
It can easily be verified that two strategy profiles ({CP}, {FP, CP}), ({CP}, {CP, CP}) are 
the only Nash equilibrium of the game. They both support the equilibrium path A→D→G. 
 
                                                                           Community 
 
                                     (FP, CP)            (FP, FP)              (CP, CP)                         (CP, FP) 
          
Government          SRP       
                    CP  
                                                                                         
 
Do sequential games have equilibra? The answer is yes, because the sequential game is of 
perfect information obtained by the backward induction method. In our game this sequential game 
has the unique Nash equilibrium, which is Pareto optimal. Here the prisoner’s dilemma is especially 
important for exploring the alternative theories of individual and group action: “if individuals are 
selected to act in their self-interest, all will defeat. If they are selected to act the group interest, all 
will cooperate” (Bergstrom, 2002:69). The CPR game is an example of the prisoners’ dilemma type, 
where cooperation yields an outcome preferred by both parties because they are able to negotiate 
before the start of the game (sequential game) and obtain binding commitments (Henley et al., 
1997:15). However, the problem of extracting CPR (here forest resources) between community and 
government of this study under JFM is an example of prisoners’ dilemma game where cooperation 
(CP, CP) yields an outcome preferred by both parties as they are able to negotiate before the start of 
the game (sequential form of game) and obtain binding commitments influencing, thereby, a long 
run viability of forest resource (a simple model of CPR game is presented in the appendix). 
But the long run viability of forest resource depends on the economic outcome of poor forest 
fringe community, which mainly depends on forest resource for their major source of income. As 
mentioned in Table 3, the main source of forest income is due to NTFPs. But the price per unit of 
some NTFPs like kendu leaves and sal seed, the collectors receive from its purchasers is very low in 
        (1, 2359)        (1, 2359)                   (1, 2570)                    (1, 2570) 
     (46650, 3723)        (1, 2613)           (46650, 3723)                    (1, 2613) 
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relation to the market price. What is more significant is that whatever amount of more valuable 
NTFPs per unit (in Rs.) the collectors desire to sell in the market they have only to sell it legally to 
the agents of LAMS (Large Adibasi Multipurpose Society), which usually pay to their collectors 
considerably lower price per unit for the amount the latter sell to the former. Table 5 shows that net 
profit per K.G. of kendu leaves for the agents of LAMPS is about hundred percent of the collector’s 
price. Similarly, net profit per K.G. of sal seeds is more than hundred percent of the collector’s price. 
This situation is more or less similar with Jharkhand state, very close to West Bengal state. In 
Jharkhand, Jharkhand State Forest Development Corporation (JSFDC), licensed traders operating on 
behalf of the state, controls kendu leaves marketing in the state, where villagers are little more than 
collectors operating as pure price takers in a monopsony, with no bargaining position and no 
incentives to improve quality above minimum standards (World Bank, 2006: 46). 
However, the success of JFM programme with respect to economic outcome for forest fringe 
community and government of this study highlights some particular issues of the poor households of 
community, which live below poverty line: 1) more than 80 percent of net annual real income of 
poor forest fringe communities yield from forest source – legal or/and illegal source(s); 2) when 
NTFPs and wage income from forest are inadequate to meet the bare subsistence level of income of 
the poor forest communities, who live below poverty line, they are involved in yielding illegal 
income by removing timber forest products from the forest land to meet up their minimum 
livelihood security; 3) wage rate for forest wage labour is fixed at Rs. 67.50, which is about a double 
of the average local wage rate, for usually eight hours of service from 8am to 4pm; 4) forest wage 
rate and the number of working days as wage labour under forest department by the poor forest 
fringe communities during present situation of JFM programme are more or less fixed; 5) the price 
per unit of some NTFPs the collectors (forest communities) receive from the agent of LAMPS is 
considerably lower than market price; and 6) the incidence of the dependence on forest income is 
considerably higher for the households which belong to lower economic condition after JFM 
programme.   
Hence the issue is: what are the means to overcome the problem of the poor categories of 
households, which live below poverty line, when legal forest income (income from legal forest 
products like NTFPs, fuel wood, timber share from government and wage income from forest) is 
inadequate to meet up their bare minimum level of subsistence? There seems to be three ways to 
tackle the situation – one is to increase the production of quick growing NTFPs, fuel wood etc. in 
order that the poor households may increase the legal collection of those products; but its proper 
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execution is hardly short term in nature. The second is to increase the existing government wage rate 
and the increase of the number of working days as wage labour under the department of forest. But 
the existing government wage rate (Rs. 67.50/- for usually eight hours’ of work a day) is high 
enough as compared with the local wage rate (local wage rate ranges between Rs. 30 to 40 for 
usually eight hours’ of work a day). Similarly the increase of labour days also depends on new 
aforestation programme, which seem to be hardly possible within a short period. The third is to 
increase the per unit price of Forest Products (FPs) the collectors have to sell to the agents of LAMS. 
This measure seems to be useful for the short period. The following simple mathematical model is 
an attempt to analyse this issue in the short run. 
We assume Ui = Ui(Z1i, Z2i)                                  ….. (1) 
where Z1 = Commodity (like TFPs) that yields illegal income, YI (measured in time unit) from forest 
resource;  Z2 = Commodity (like NTFPs, wage-labour on forest related service) that yields legal 
income, YL (measured in monetary unit) from forest resource; and i = Individual i of poor categories 
of households which live below poverty line.  
Thus we can write        Z1i ≡    YIi 
                     and             Z2i ≡ YLi 
             then          Ui = f(YI, YL)                        ….. (2) 
YI is risky and punishable offence for the members of a household if legal authority takes 
action against the criminal. But its implications seem to be insignificant for the individuals of very 
poor category of households because YI including YL, which would yield illegal income for all i 
before JFM programme, was the major source of livelihood security for the same categories of 
households before JFM programme; moreover after JFM programme YI is one of the major sources 
of the income for poor individuals in one FPC (Baragari), where legal source of income from forest 
products is very low in relation to the individuals of very poor category of households in other 
villages ( Table 3). So it is assumed that f(YI, YL) is continuous and has first and second order partial 
derivatives; it is regular strictly quasi-concave function. The rate of substitution of YL for YI is 
  – 
2
1
f
f
dY
dY
I
L =  
But YI = TF – [ LL WW +′ ]                                       ….. (3) 
where TF = Total units of available time for forest work by an individual; ′LW = Total units of 
available time for the collection of legal forest products like NTFPs and LW  = Total time of legal 
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wage work (fixed) under forest department. It is assumed that total available time is 24 hours, and 
the individual will never work more than 12 hours per day [
∝−t
Lim ( ′LW + LW ) = 12]. 
Then the budget constraint is   
  YL = p ′LW  + r LW                                                 ….. (4) 
where p = price of legal NTFPs; and r = forest wage rate, which is fixed at r . 
Thus U = f(TF – [ LL WW +′ ], p ′LW  + r LW )                 ….. (5) 
To maximize utility we set the derivative of (5) with respect to ′LW  equal zero 
                                   
′
LdW
dU
= – f1 + f2p = 0 
and therefore                        – 
2
1
f
f
dY
dY
I
L = = p                               …..(6) 
This second order condition is satisfied provided that it is negative. 
                                2
2
LWd
Ud
′
= f11 – 2f12 p′+ f22p2 < 0 
Equation (6) is a relation in terms of legal forest work ( ′LW ) and price of legal forest 
commodities (p) and is based on the behavior of individual, who live below poverty line. Equation 
(6) is, therefore, the supply curve for legal forest work and states how much individual i will legally 
work at various prices of NTFPs. Since the supply curve of legal forest work is equivalent to 
demand for legal income, (6) indirectly provides the individual’s demand curve for legal income. We 
also assume that YI is a normal good.  Then hours in legal forest work will increase with the increase 
of price of NTFPs. The higher price for legal forest products like NTFPs will induce the individual i 
to reduce his illegal work time of forest related work (like collection of TFPs) and so reduces YI 
(Figure 3) so long as individual i’s economic condition does not improve. So, the positive 
relationship between ′LW  and p and the consequent reduction of YI will continue till the point (P3). 
When the price makes individual i so well off that he is induced to cut down legal working time WL 
(i.e. increase the YI time) and earn a higher income.  But this condition implies a better economic 
condition (or upward mobility) of very poor categories of individuals. Practically, when the 
individual will be well off, he will also have more opportunities to increase his income other than 
forest source. Out study also clearly suggests that more well off individuals are less dependent on 
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income from forest resources (Table 2). So P4 provides an indication that individual i is less 
dependent on income from forest resource (a better economic condition or a upward mobility of 
individual i). 
 
VI.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This empirical study suggests that the economic outcome of the JFM programme has been 
beneficial for both community belonging to marginal landholding, small landholding and landless 
agricultural households and government and this is due to the strict dominant cooperative strategy of 
community. But the earlier forest policy of the government was oriented with the commercial need 
of the government disregarding the traditional right and benefit of the forest fringe communities. 
Economically government was the worst sufferer for her SRP, because law or force could not 
effectively control the illegal collection of forest products of the poor forest fringe communities 
which mainly depend on income from forest resource and that live below poverty line, until and 
unless a bare minimum level of subsistence level of these communities was met up. The success of 
JFM programme has proved that active involvement of forest fringe communities in protection, 
regeneration and development planning of forest resource not only provides a significant increase in 
income of the community but also begets a major increase in income of the government who failed 
to receive such income while she executed SRP. The higher economic outcome of the government is 
due to the cooperation of community whom government neglected earlier. Similarly, the coordinated 
action by the community, which belong to marginal landholding, small landholding and landless 
agricultural households, also help them generate a substantial increase of forest income after JFM as 
compared with before JFM mainly from two sources – NTFPs and forest wage, the highest 
contribution being the NTFPs’ source. But the incidence of forest income is higher for the 
households which belong to lower land-based economic condition and that live below poverty line 
after JFM. However, the CPR game of our study, which follows from our empirical evidence, 
suggests that the interaction between community and government over a trade off between economic 
outcome from extracting commonly owned renewable forest resource has been beneficial for both 
guided by cooperation (CP, CP) preferred by both parties within a variety of institutional 
arrangement under JFM programme leading, thereby, to exploit the forest more sustainably 
compared with the system of strict regulatory policy (SRP) of government before JFM. Although 
forest resource of south West Bengal including our study area was resuscitated and restored to 
productivity with great improved in quality and density after JFM compared with before JFM, as 
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mentioned in SFR (2000:47), the institutional arrangement of JFM could not retain the poor 
households which are mainly dependent on forest resource for their livelihood security and that live 
below poverty line, from illegal collection of timber products until and unless a considerable income 
from legal forest sources – NTFPs, forestry wage and government’ timber share – meets their 
livelihood security. This study also suggests that the prices per unit of NTFPs the collectors have to 
sell to the agents of LAMPS are considerably lower than their market prices. 
In this perspective, however, there seems to be three ways to tackle these problems within the 
existing JFM programme – one is to increase the production of quick growing NTFPs, fuelwood etc. 
in order that the very poor households may increase the legal collection of those products; but this 
depends on the participatory forest management programmes and its proper execution which is 
hardly short term in nature. Secondly, the existing government wage rate on forest work is 
considerably higher (about a double) than that of the average local wage rate. The increase of labour 
days by the forest department depends on new afforestation programme, which also seems to be 
hardly possible within a short period. The third is to increase the price per unit of NTFPs the 
collectors have to sell to the agents of LAMS.  So, in order to have the higher economic outcome 
and the higher outreach of the JFM programme, government should restrict the power of the 
LAMPS so that the collectors of NTFPs may sell their products at a higher price in the market and 
increase their income. But the increase of the collectors’ price of NTFPs may not increase 
considerable income of the households below poverty line for the long period. Together with it, 
more pro-poor programmes under both government and non-government initiatives that complement 
the benefit of JFM programme need to be introduced. 
 
 
Appendix :  
We start with a static model of the CPR as an n-person game (Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; 
Chichilnisky, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992) which has been used by Sethi and Somanathan (1996). We 
exclude the assumption of costly sanction on the violation of illegal collection of forest products or 
of institutional arrangement under JFM. As mentioned in the text, institutional arrangement of JFM 
could not restrain the poor households, which are mainly dependent on forest resource for their 
livelihood security and that live below poverty line, from illegal collection of forest products 
(timber) until and unless a considerable income from legal forest sources meets up their minimum 
livelihood security. Force or law can not effectively control the illegal collection of TFPs of the 
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landless and marginal categories of households. Hence the possibility of costly sanction against the 
violation of extracting illegal forest products under JFM programme of this study is ruled out. We 
also assume a fixed number of n individuals who have complete rights of access and removal to the 
forest resource, a renewable natural resource, from a ‘common pool’ under institutional 
arrangements of JFM. Let the labour or effort expanded per unit of time by agent (FPC member 
household) i on resource extraction be li and the aggregate lobour expanded, L. The sum of 
individual labour flows: 
                          ∑
=
=
n
i
ilL
1
 
First, we assume the case where the total stock of resource K=Ko, an exogenously given 
constant. Then the aggregate harvesting per unit of time is a function of aggregate flow L and 
exogenously given constant Ko i.e. 
h(L, Ko) = f(L)   …………….(1) 
We assume fL>0, fLL<0 i.e. the total harvest per unit of time is an increasing function of effort 
and the value of the function is increasing at a deceasing rate. We also assume A(L)= f(L)/L is 
decreasing. Each extra effort (labour) of an individual FPC member reduces the harvest available for 
other FPC member and therefore the average harvest. In other words f(L)/L diminishes as li 
increases. Let us assume that the cost of labour per unit of time is w, which is constant and 
exogenously given. This is true because empirical evidence of this study reveals that the wage rate 
for forest wage labour per day is fixed at Rs.67.50 (discussed in the text). If we normalize the price 
of resource to unity, the efficient level of effort (we ignore changes in the stock) at which the 
marginal product of labour equals the wage 
           ( ) wLf =′  …………….(2) 
The share of total harvest obtained by ith FPC member is directly proportional to the share of 
FPC member i’s effort to total effort, so that FPC member i’s net benefit from resource extraction, 
denoted by Πi , is 
Πi (l1, l2,….., ln) = ( ) ii wlLfL
l
−  
Therefore the aggregate payoff p (l1, l2, ....., ln) satisfies 
( ) ( )∑
=
−==
n
i
in wLLflllp
1
21 ,....., π  
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Let cL ˆ be the level of aggregate effort which maximizes p. this is the efficient level of effort 
(given the stock) at which the marginal product of labour equals the wage ( ) wLf c =′ ˆ . 
This is shown in Figure a. cL ˆ is unique due to concavity of the function. 
Let us now examine what the outcome will be under the usual assumption of rational, self-
interested behaviour by each FPC member. Each FPC member will compare his/her return 
( )LLfLA /)()( = with the cost of effort, w . Concavity of the function means that A(L)  is decreasing 
(mentioned earlier). The FPC member intending harvesting an additional unit will compare 
f(L+1)/(L+1) with w and will go on harvesting if f(L+1)/(L+1)> w . However, from individual point 
of view labour will be added to the stock harvesting until wcLC =&& / (Figure a). This may be 
interpreted as free entry, zero profit condition with 
A(L) w=   ……………(3) 
Payoff of ith FPC member is now 
Πi (li, L) ( )wLAli −= )(  
While the aggregate payoff is  
P ( )wLAL −= )(  
Thus if the resource is characterized by open access, so that the number of user can expand 
without limit, then it is clear that labour will be put in until the average product equals the wage and 
rents(profits) are driven to zero as shown at CL &  in Figure a. This is clearly inefficient, because 
adding harvesting has a negative externality effect on the forest resource. However, disregarding the 
negative externality, each individual will put in more labour them is efficient so long as there is 
positively rent (profit) from the extraction (or harvesting). The CRP game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium, which is symmetric with Li cL=  for all FPC members. It is inefficient and involves 
overexploitation CC LL <ˆ . There are positive rents in equilibrium: CCC LnLL &<=  so 
that wLA C >)( . This is the classic problem of the common users: each individual would be better off 
if all would restrain their use, but it is never in the interest of any individual to do so (Dasgupta and 
Heal, 1979; Hardin, 1968; Weitzman, 1974; Sethi and Somanathan, 1996). 
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Figure a 
 
In the case of resource dynamics, the case of renewable forest resources is different from the 
assumption of exogenously given forest resource by virtue of the fact that it is naturally generated 
within a time period relevant to human exploitation. Renewable resources are often assumed to 
follow a ‘natural growth law’ which is assumed to be simply a function of the size of resource stock. 
The relationship is not monotonic, but inverse U-shape (the logistic growth function). The growth 
rate at first rises with the size of stock, and then falls i.e., the slope of the curve is positive and 
decreasing. It is due to the fact that the natural environment has a ‘carrying capacity’ for the 
resource; a maximum population that it can sustain. There is zero growth rate for this size of stock. 
We assume equal effort level by each type of player – government and community – under 
cooperative management of forest in the dynamic analysis. This is, mainly, because the CPR game 
of our study considers two types of players – community and government – in community forestry 
where forest department and community jointly manage the forest protection activities within a joint 
cooperative institutional framework without any costly sanctions. Hence we assume equal effort 
level for both – community and government. Then there is the unique Nash equilibrium for all FPC 
members at which maximum sustainable yield is equated to the corresponding resource stock. This 
stage is called the socially optimum average effort level corresponding to the resource stock (Sethi 
and Somanathan, 1996, 777-8). This is shown at KM in Figure b. If we indigenize K, the aggregate 
harvest per unit of time is a function 
 
H(L, K)  ……………………(4) 
CL &  
MR 
AR 
TR 
AC = MC = w 
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As renewable resources are often assumed to follow natural growth law, HK>0, HKK<0. 
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In addition to its dependence on the harvest, the evolution of the resource stock will depend 
on its own natural rate of replenishment, which we represent by the differentiable function R(K). 
There is finite carrying capacity of the resource stock (KL in Figure b) so that R(K)<0 for K>KL, and 
R(KL) = 0. Let KF>0 be the minimum viable stock, so that R(K) > 0 for KF<K<KL, and R(K) < 0 for 
0<K<KF. The minimum viable stock is the level below which the resource can not recover by natural 
reproduction even in the absence of harvesting. Finally, let R be a unique maximum at some KM. 
This is the standard specification used to characterize the dynamic of renewable resources. The 
growth rate of the resource stock, taking account of harvesting, is then given by  
),()( KLHKIK −=&  ……………(5) 
The extraction per unit of effort is assumed constant proportion of the stock. Letting LM(K) 
denote the (statistically) socially optimum average effort level and LN(K) denotes the Nash 
equilibrium effort level corresponding to resource stock K, it is clear that LM(K)=LN(K)=0. The 
stable cooperative equilibrium point of the system is the type of behaviour and levels of resource 
stock that we may expect to see in the long run. This is satisfied at the aggregate effort levels L and 
resource stock K for which 0=K& . For any KF<K<KL, I(K)>0, so by putting in enough effort the 
harvest can be raised high enough that it equals the rate of replenishment, thus causing K&  to equals 
zero (KM in Figure b). The average product now depends both on aggregate extraction effort and the 
resource stock 
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L
KLHKLA ),(),( =  
As we assume equal effort level for each type of player – government and community – 
under cooperative management of forest, the payoff of each type of player will be  
( )wKLAKlii −= ),()(π  
Therefore, the aggregate payoff is  
( )wKLAKL
n
i
i −=∑
=
),()(
1
π  
In this perspective it is relevant to mention that the game theoretic framework of Sethi and 
Somanathan (1996) shows that whenever there is a stable non-cooperative equilibrium (one in which 
individuals do not restrain their use with different effort level) with a positive renewable stock, then 
there is a cooperative equilibrium with a higher stock and that cooperative norms of behaviour is 
stable. The CPR model of our study also suggests that in spite of equal effort level for each type of 
player, cooperative equilibrium is also stable with the highest level of stock. 
Let us consider a two stage game: the first stage discussed in the CPR game and the second 
one is the game in which individuals have the option of imposing sanctions on other agent in 
response to their observed extraction level. Sanctioning behaviour is costly not only for the 
punished, but also for the punisher (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996:771). But such a sanctioning 
behaviour is unimportant in our empirical study. Hence at KM, there is unique sub-game perfect 
equilibrium in which all agents choose LN effort level and no agent sanctions any other. Hirshleifer 
and Rasmusen (1989) show that cooperation can be sustained in sub-game perfect equilibrium in a 
finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with rationing. Ostrom et al.(1992) show that even in clearing 
specified finite horizon games designed to extract commons, high level cooperation can be sustained 
if the possibility of pre-game communication is present, with or without the possibility of costly 
sanctions. It seems to be relevant to mention that despite without the possibility of costly sanctions 
against the violators (poor forest fringe communities) of extracting illegal forest products, forest 
resources in south West Bengal including our study area was resuscitated and restored to 
productivity with great improvement in quality and density as a result of participatory and JFM 
activities compared with before JFM situation (SFR, 2000:47). 
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Notes 
1) Farm income implies earnings from sales of field crops including fruit crops. Self-employment includes 
non-forest based business like resale of agricultural commodities, tailor, money lending, sales of fish, 
grocery sales, public transport operation, radio and bike repair, tinsmith, and stone breaking. Wage work 
includes non-forest off-farm employment like contract agricultural labour, forestry officer, teacher, 
mechanic, watchman, and village headperson. Sales assets consider sales of livestock and poultry, 
property rental, and sales of personal and household items. Transfers include remittance from household 
residents, gifts from relatives, and loans. 
2) We take all samples for our study from Bankura district only since almost all female FPCs in West Bengal 
are operating in Bankura district, being extended to all three forest divisions – Bankura (north), Bankura 
(south), and Panchet S C – of the district. As this paper has been prepared based on PhD research work 
entitled ‘Women’s Dependence on Forest and Participation in Forestry: A Case Study of Joint Forest 
Management Programme in West Bengal’, we consider all samples from Bankura district in south West 
Bengal where the vast tract of forest land containing mainly the sal were overexploited and degraded 
before JFM situation. After JFM the forest land under our study have been resuscitated and restored to 
productivity with great improvement in quality and density. 
3) It is worth mentioning that forest officials usually take the primary initiative (during 1988-89) for the 
establishment of both joint FPC and female FPCs in this area. They first speak to the local forest 
communities, local panchayet bodies about the utility of the establishment of FPC under JFM programme. 
Later, local forest communities and local panchayet respond to it. 
4) In the irrigated area households possessing cultivable land between 0.01 and 2.49 acres are treated as 
marginal farmer households, between 2.50 and 4.99 acres, as small farmer households, while in the 
unirrigated area, this is twice the area of their irrigated lands.  
5) Poverty line income in rural West Bengal on the basis of PCME (per capita monthly expenditure) by NSS 
of 55th round (1999-00) is Rs. 350.17. Based on the CPIAL (Consumer Price Index of Agricultural Labour 
[General]) per capita monthly expenditure for the year 2005-06, the poverty line income for the year 
2005-06 is calculated as Rs. 393 approximately.  
6) Indian Labour Journal (1991, Vol. 32, No. 4: p. 662) provides the Consumer Price Index Number of 
Agriculture Labour (General) for rural West Bengal on and from 1990-91 to 1995-96, the base year being 
1960-61. Similarly, Indian Labour Journal (2005, Vol. 46, No. 12: p. 1225) provides the same for rural 
West Bengal on and from 1995-96 to 2005-06 with 1986-87 as base year. We then shift the base year of 
1960-61 to 1986-87 for all the years from 1990-91 to 2005-06. Again we shift the base year from 1986-87 
to 2005-06 and calculate the CPIAL from 1990-91 to 2005-06. 
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7) Never did the respondents say that their source of income was illegal; rather, while examining the answer 
from the respondents regarding their break-up of their source of income, the distinction between legal and 
illegal source was clearly demarcated.   
8) It might be a game of complete information because each player’s payoff function (the function that 
determines the player’s payoff from the combination of action chosen by the players) is common 
knowledge among all the players (Gibbons, 1992: 2). 
9) SRP is no longer strictly dominated by CP, because both strategies provide same payoff (Re 1) to the 
government if community adopts a FP strategy, but strictly higher payoff to government if community 
adopts CP. 
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 Table 1: Some Basic Characteristics of the Sample FPC/Village Households 
Status of agricultural land 
holding** 
Sex of FPC 
member Division FPC/Village 
No. 
of 
HH 
Average 
size 
of 
HH 
% of HH 
live below 
poverty 
line* 
Size of forest 
land (ha.) 
protected 
under JFMP Land less Marginal Small Female {Male} 
  % of HH 
  belongs to 
  SC [ST]  
  category 
% of  
 illiterate 
FPC  
 member 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Agua 23 4.52 100 13.75 19 4 0 23{0} 100 [0] 95.24 Bankura 
North Belboni 44 4.95 100 70 41 3 0 2{42} 100 [0] 86.36 
Malibona 41 4.97 95.12 70 4 35 2 41{0} 9.75[90.25] 51.22 Bankura 
South Baragari 45 5.44 77.78 70 3 32 10 2{43}  2.22 [8.89] 33.33 
Brindabanpur 56 4.80 80.36 56 29 16 11 56{0} 100 [0] 77.50  Panchayet 
S C Katul-2 93 5.08 84.95 180 33 46 14 3{90} 100 [0] 42.63 
  
* Poverty line in year 2005-06 is per capita expenditure of Rs. 393 /- 
** Holding of agricultural land from 0.01 to 2.50 acres are treated as marginal, from 2.51 to 5.00 acres as small. For unirrigated land these would be doubled. 
 
 
Table 2: Annual Net Real Income (in Rs.) from All Sources of Sample Households* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Present Before % change  
 
FPC/ Village 
 
 
Category
of 
  house-
holds 
Net return from 
forest  
   sources 
                   
Net return from 
non-forest 
  sources 
                  
Net return 
 from all  
  sources 
                
Net return from 
forest  
   sources 
                   
 Net return   from 
non-forest  
   sources 
               
Net  return  
from all 
   sources 
                 
Net return 
from 
forest 
sources 
Net return 
from non-
forest 
source 
Net  
return 
from all 
sources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Landless 327825.8 (86.14) 0.29 
52747.4 
(13.86) 1.48 
380573.2 
(100.00) 1.08 
173018.4 
(64.36) 0.36 
95810.6 
(35.64) 3.42 
268829.0 
(100.00) 2.11 89.47 - 44.95 41.56 
Agua 
Marginal 65496.0 (85.06) 0.38 
11503.8 
(14.94) 1.59 
76999.80 
(100.00) 1.19 
42175.6 
(67.87) 0.48 
19964.2 
(32.13) 3.96 
62139.8 
(100.00) 2.49 
55.29 
 
- 42.38 38.04 
CV
 CV  CV   CV  CV  CV 
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*The real income is determined after deflating the money income by cost of living index (general) of agricultural labour. We consider 2005-06 as the base year. 
   
  CV = coefficient of variation. 
 
 
 
Landless 766193.2 (87.66) 0.24 
107857.9 
(12.34) 1.16 
874051.1 
(100.00) 1.01 
430512.0 
(63.92) 0.33 
243004.9 
(36.08) 3.09 
673516.9 
(100.00) 1.90 77.97 - 55.61 29.77 
Belboni 
Marginal 53202.7 (85.84) 0.30 
8776.2 
(14.16) 1.31 
61978.9 
(100.00) 1.12 
31508.2 
(64.89) 0.44 
17048.2 
(35.11) 3.48 
48556.4 
(100.00) 2.21 68.85 - 48.52 27.64 
Landless 76308.4 (89.62) 0.32 
8838.2 
(10.38) 1.86 
85146.6 
(100.00) 1.30 
44898.8 
(65.12) 0.38 
24049.1 
(34.88) 3.57 
68947.9 
(100.00) 2.20 69.96 - 63.25 23.49 
Marginal 681299.2 (88.18) 0.41 
91324.0 
(11.82) 1.92 
772623.2 
(100.00) 1.39 
425916.3 
(64.88) 0.51 
230551.6 
(35.12) 3.95 
656467.9 
(100.00) 2.53 59.96 - 60.39 17.69 Malibona 
Small 37745.8 (86.20) 0.83 
6042.8 
(13.80) 2.21 
43788.60 
(100.00) 1.96 
26510.9 
(78.51) 1.25 
7256.4 
(21.49) 4.12 
33767.3 
(100.00) 3.36 42.38 - 16.72 29.68 
Landless 51154.2 (72.16) 0.39 
19735.8 
(27.84) 1.66 
70890.00 
(100.00) 1.27 
38831.5 
(64.11) 0.62 
21738.6 
(35.89) 3.75 
60570.1 
(100.00) 2.54 31.73 - 9.21 17.04 
Marginal 574257.2 (70.75) 0.58 
237413.8 
(29.25) 2.12 
811671.0 
(100.00) 1.69 
460344.3 
(64.00) 0.99 
258943.6 
(36.00) 3.92 
719287.9 
(100.00) 3.02 24.74 - 8.31 12.84 Baragari 
Small 133182.4 (56.06) 0.98 
104388.8 
(43.94) 2.57 
237571.2 
(100.00) 2.31 
140987.2 
(61.56) 1.67 
88036.8 
(38.44) 4.26 
229024.0 
(100.00) 3.85 - 5.53 - 18.60 3.73 
Landless 574140.6 (81.24) 0.35 
132581.0 
(18.76) 1.75 
706721.6 
(100.00) 1.25 
360161.6 
(62.10) 0.41 
219808.8 
(37.90) 3.41 
579970.4 
(100.00) 2.17 59.41 - 39.68 21.85 
Marginal 298869.9 (80.91) 0.44 
70515.7 
(19.09) 1.99 
369385.6 
(100.00) 1.48 
214342.2 
(66.40) 0.83 
108461.4 
(33.60) 3.68 
322803.6 
(100.00) 2.71 43.42 - 34.98 14.43 Brindabanpur 
Small 166586.3 (79.83) 0.76 
42090.1 
(20.17) 2.57 
208676.4 
(100.00) 2.09 
116871.0 
(70.58) 1.08 
48718.5 
(29.42) 3.89 
165589.5 
(100.00) 3.09 42.54 - 13.60 26.02 
Landless 651273.6 (83.12) 0.36 
132260.6 
(16.88) 1.82 
783534.2 
(100.00) 1.31 
374660.7 
(63.23) 0.59 
217875.5 
(36.77) 3.50 
592536.2 
(100.00) 2.40 73.83 - 39.29 32.23 
Marginal 846732.2 (82.55) 0.51 
178988.2 
(17.45) 2.04 
1025720.4 
(100.00) 1.56 
519358.3 
(65.25) 0.92 
276542.3 
(34.75) 3.82 
795900.6 
(100.00) 2.88 63.03 - 35.28 28.87 Katul-2 
Small 295158.8 (80.72) 0.85 
70498.8 
(19.28) 2.55 
365657.6 
(100.00) 2.18 
211210.5 
(72.20) 1.14 
81344.8 
(27.80) 4.01 
292553.3 
(100.00) 3.20 39.75 - 13.33 24.99 
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Table 3: Annual Net Real Income Share (in percentage) by Sources of Sample Households 
Net return from forest sources Net return from non-forest sources % change 
TFPsa Net return from forest sources Net return from non-forest sources 
FPC/Village Category 
of 
households NTFPs 
Forestry 
wage Total Illegal Farm
b
 
Non-forest 
wagec Others
d
 NTFPs Forestry wage TFPs Farm Non-forest wage Others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Landless 58.68 (19.67) 
14.52 
(8.24) 
11.86 
(36.45) 
11.67 
(36.45) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.59 
(25.35) 
5.27 
(10.29) 198.32 76.21 
- 64.50 
[- 67.98] - - 66.11 - 48.79 Agua 
Marginal 58.92 (22.73) 
13.97 
(8.27) 
11.17 
(36.87) 
10.86 
(36.87) 
5.08 
(5.99) 
4.31 
(14.21) 
5.55 
(11.93) 159.21 68.92 
-66.99 
[- 70.57] - 15.19 - 69.67 - 53.48 
Landless 53.56 (15.75) 
15.35 
(7.50) 
17.32 
(40.67) 
17.18 
(40.67) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.83 
(26.64) 
3.51 
(9.44) 240.19 104.67 
- 53.91 
[- 57.76] - - 66.85 - 62.82 Belboni 
Marginal 54.54 (14.45) 
13.34 
(8.18) 
16.96 
(42.26) 
16.34 
(42.26) 
4.72 
(5.17) 
4.55 
(18.78) 
4.89 
(11.16) 277.47 63.08 
- 57.51 
[- 61.33] - 8.70 - 75.77 - 56.18 
Landless 53.61 (19.46) 
16.34 
(10.36) 
18.46 
(35.30) 
18.58 
(35.30) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
6.80 
(23.62) 
3.58 
(11.26) 175.47 57.72 
- 44.27 
[- 47.37] - - 71.21 - 68.21 
Marginal 55.93 (19.61) 
14.17 
(10.41) 
17.68 
(34.86) 
17.03 
(34.86) 
4.58 
(4.90) 
2.40 
(16.45) 
4.84 
(13.77) 185.19 36.12 
- 48.12 
[- 51.15] - 6.53 - 85.41 - 64.85 Malibona 
Small 59.79 (38.14) 
11.62 
(7.75) 
14.79 
(32.62) 
13.73 
(32.62) 
7.35 
(7.62) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
6.45 
(13.87) 56.76 49.94 
- 54.66 
[- 57.92] - 3.54 - - 53.50 
Landless 17.55 (14.46) 
8.61 
(6.64) 
45.99 
(43.01) 
44.85 
(43.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
18.44 
(22.45) 
9.40 
(13.44) 21.39 29.67 
6.94 
[4.28] - - 17.86 - 30.06 
Marginal 18.36 (17.07) 
8.51 
(5.87) 
43.17 
(41.06) 
42.81 
(41.06) 
3.88 
(4.05) 
15.50 
(18.20) 
9.87 
(13.75) 7.57 44.97 
6.86 
[4.26] - 4.20 - 14.84 - 28.22 Baragari 
Small 19.45 (20.44) 
4.77 
(3.15) 
31.84 
(37.97) 
30.70 
(37.97) 
19.48 
(17.55) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
24.46 
(20.89) - 4.84 51.43 
- 16.14 
[- 19.15] 11.00 - - 17.09 
Landless 57.77 (34.85) 
17.61 
(8.16) 
4.09 
(19.09) 
3.51 
(19.09) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
10.30 
(22.15) 
8.46 
(15.75) 65.76 115.81 
- 69.30 
[- 81.61] - - 53.50 - 46.29 
Marginal 58.89 (41.36) 
17.24 
(8.08) 
3.41 
(16.96) 
2.30 
(16.96) 
6.32 
(7.56) 
4.07 
(9.86) 
8.70 
(16.18) 42.38 113.37 
- 71.80 
[- 86.44] - 16.4 -58.72 - 46.23 Brindabanpur 
Small 64.62 (48.39) 
12.05 
(6.40) 
3.16 
(15.79) 
0.14 
(15.79) 
10.94 
(12.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
9.23 
(17.37) 33.54 88.28 
- 79.99 
[- 99.11] - 9.21 - - 46.86 
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Landless 52.77 (9.76) 
16.47 
(7.42) 
12.45 
(46.05) 
12.75 
(46.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
9.60 
(23.88) 
7.28 
(12.89) 440.73 121.97 
- 69.87 
[- 72.31] - - 59.80 - 43.52 
Marginal 54.67 (14.01) 
15.80 
(6.98) 
11.78 
(44.26) 
10.88 
(44.26) 
6.57 
(6.90) 
3.25 
(12.84) 
7.63 
(15.01) 290.23 126.36 
- 72.71 
[- 75.42] - 4.78 - 74.69 - 49.17 Katul-2 
Small 59.90 (26.24) 
11.48 
(5.33) 
9.34 
(40.63) 
8.32 
(40.63) 
11.06 
(11.51) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
8.22 
(16.29) 128.28 115.38 
- 77.01 
[- 79.53] - 3.91 - - 49.54 
  
Notes: 1. Figures within ( ) and [ ] represent the value during before situation of JFM programme and percentage change of illegal timber forest products respectively; 
            
 2. a) TFPs(timber forest products) include net return from two sources – share from government’ timber sale and sale of illegally collected timber; b) net return from sale of farm 
crops including households crops; c) non-forest wage includes farm and/or non-farm labour wage other than forest wage employment; and d) others’ non-forest source 
includes net return from self-employment(business activities like market middle man, tailor, and radio and bike repair) and net return from sale of livestock, personal and 
household items etc. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Annual Net Real Income (Rs.) from Forest for BPL Categories of Households  
Present net return of forest from Before net return of forest from % change  
FPC/ Village Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All sources Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All sources Legal 
sources 
Illegal 
sources 
All sources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agua 281848 (71.66) 
45360 
(11.53) 
393322 
[85.96] 
136594 
(63.47) 
78600 
(36.52) 
215194 
[65.00] 106.34 - 42.29 82.78 
Belboni 549153 (67.02) 
140280 
(17.12) 
819396 
[87.54] 
273620 
(59.22) 
188400 
(40.78) 
462020 
[63.98] 100.70 - 25.54 77.35 
Malibona 516157 (68.13) 
130200 
(17.19) 
757608 
[88.32] 
306487 
(65.10) 
164278 
(34.90) 
470765 
[64.90] 68.41 - 20.77 60.93 
Baragari 255426 (40.84) 
268800 
(42.98) 
625411 
[70.86] 
293343 
(58.76) 
205833 
(41.23) 
499176 
[64.00] - 12.92 30.59 25.28 
Brindabanpur 670515 (76.80) 
26880 
(3.08) 
873010 
[81.13] 
469198 
(81.67) 
105306 
(18.33) 
574504 
[63.64] 42.91 - 74.47 51.96 
Katul-2 1067680 (71.27) 
174720 
(11.66) 
1498006 
[82.80] 
491638 
(54.99) 
402381 
(45.01) 
894019 
[64.39] 117.17 - 56.58 67.56 
Total 556796 (67.13) 
131040 
(15.83) 
827792 
[82.51] 
328480 
(63.26) 
190808 
(36.74) 
519288 
[64.25] 69.51 - 31.32 59.41 
  
* Figures within ( ) represent percentages out of total forest income; Figures within [ ] represent percentages of forest income out of total income. 
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Table 5: Variation in Price of Some Valuable NTFPs the Collectors’ sell to the Agents of LAMPS                      Rs. per KG 
       Midvalue and range+ 
Name of 
NTFPs 
 Collectors’ price       Processing, transport               Market price                                Profit * 
                                        and other costs 
1            2                                          3                                              4                                                5 
Kendu leaves 
Sal seeds 
       20±5                                    13±4                                       52±4.50                                     19±4.50 
    0.75±0.50                            1.50±0.70                               4.00±0.60                                  1.75±0.60 
   
+  The method is suggested by Rudra (1992) 
* Column 5 = [ 4 – ( 2 + 3 ) ] 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Payoff matrix of static game 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in dynamic game 
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 Payoff to 
 government          1                               1     46650                       1                                                           46650            
 Payoff to  
 community           2359                    2570    3723                    2613                                                          3723 
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          (2570, 1)                         (3723, 46650) 
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Figure 3: Legal-illegal income substitutability 
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